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The Great (Data) Bank Robbery:
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the “SWIFT Aﬀ air” 1
Summary
The present paper examines current dynamics of surveillance regarding the ﬁ ght against “terrorism” and its 
ﬁ nancing. Close analysis of the so-called “SWIFT Aﬀ air” and the US terrorist ﬁ nance tracking program draw 
a  en" on to one speciﬁ c case-study which allows us to ques" on the contemporary poli" cs of massively accessing 
commercial data-banks for intelligence purposes. With reference to the SWIFT aﬀ air, the paper explores a 
sensi" ve aspect of transatlan" c coopera" on in the ﬁ eld of counter-terrorism.
Résumé
Ce texte a pour objec" f d’examiner les dynamiques de surveillance à l’œuvre dans le domaine de la lu  e contre 
le « terrorisme » et son ﬁ nancement. En proposant une analyse détaillée de l’« aﬀ aire SWIFT » et du Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Program américain, le présent texte met donc en lumière un programme spéciﬁ que qui va 
nous perme  re de ques" onner les velléités contemporaines d’accès aux bases de données commerciales à des 
ﬁ ns de renseignement. Ce  e étude explore ainsi un aspect sensible de la coopéra" on an" terroriste à l’échelle 
transatlan" que. 
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In comba" ng terrorism, preven" on is key. The en" re Department of Jus" ce has 
shi& ed its focus to a proac" ve approach to terrorism, reﬂ ec" ng the reality that it 
is not good enough to wait to prosecute terrorist crimes a& er they occur. For the 
law-enforcement oﬃ  cers responsible for staying a step ahead of the terrorists 
in these inves" ga" ons, " me is cri" cal. Even a brief delay in an inves" ga" on may 
be disastrous. Therefore, these oﬃ  cers need tools that allow them to obtain 
informa" on and act as quickly as possible. Administra" ve subpoenas are one 
tool that will enable inves" gators to avoid costly delays. An administra" ve 
subpoena is an order from a government oﬃ  cial to a third party, instruc" ng 
the recipient to produce certain informa" on. Because the subpoena is issued 
directly by an agency oﬃ  cial, it can be issued as quickly as the development of 
an inves" ga" on requires. (The United State Judiciary Commi  ee 2004)
As a part of our eﬀ orts to track the funds of terrorists, we are conﬁ rming that 
we have subpoenaed records on terrorist-related transac" ons from SWIFT. (US 
Department of the Treasury 2006a)
This [terrorist ﬁ nance tracking] program is exactly the kind of program that 
Americans want and expect from their government to prevent further terrorist 
a  acks. (US Department of the Treasury 2006b)
Two years separate Rachel Brand’s promo" on of administra" ve subpoenas for counter-terrorism 
purposes and the oﬃ  cial acknowledgement of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (henceforth 
TFTP) which has been ini" ated shortly a& er the September 11th, 2001 a  acks. This program represents 
a paradigma" c example of the recurrent use of such subpoenas against commercial companies, here 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunica" on (henceforth SWIFT). Furthermore, 
such an example perfectly illustrates at least two major convergent trends of contemporary counter-
terrorism frameworks, the “preven" on” claim and the prominence of ﬁ nancial dimension. 
In connec" on with proac" ve management of the elusive “terrorist risk,” the former technique of 
“following the money” is not only associated with deterrent and inves" ga" ve func" ons but also with 
(ques" onable) preven" ve performance (Biersteker and Eckert 2008; Levi 2010; Malkin and Elizur 2002). 
According to Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, “money laundering regula" on is evolving from a 
regulatory tool designed to conﬁ scate criminal money a& er the act (with a desired deterring eﬀ ect) 
to a regulatory tool required to predict and apprehend poten" al terrorists” (Amoore and de Goede 
2005:152). Indeed, using “terrorist ﬁ nance” as an intelligence tool in the name of proac" ve form of 
preven" on becomes one of the rou" ne prac" ces of current counter-terrorism strategies. The pervasive 
rhetoric of technological ﬁ x and “public-private” (mostly law enforcement-banks) partnership insists 
on IT equipment and co-produc" on of intelligence to prevent “terrorist risk” (for an analysis of such a 
rhetoric in prac" ce and the blurred no" on of “terrorist risk”, see Amicelle 2011; Favarel-Garrigues et 
al. 2009).
Besides the ins" tu" onalized produc" on of “public-private” intelligence led policing, the US terrorist 
ﬁ nance tracking program and its correlated transatlan" c “SWIFT aﬀ air” refer to this convergent 
trend between preven" ve orienta" on and the ﬁ nancial part of counter-terrorism. The present paper 
precisely aims at analyzing this TFTP program. Its very existence and ongoing transforma" on are 
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oﬃ  cially presented as a new approach in the ﬁ ght against “terrorism” and its ﬁ nancing.2 Somewhat 
paradoxically, though, this so-called new step in ﬁ nancial intelligence and remote surveillance mainly 
remain an under-research area. While there have been many specula" ons and misapprehensions 
from various sides since the unauthorized leak on the TFTP existence, the paper primarily proposes 
an overview of the SWIFT aﬀ air. We set out to highlight the various issues at stake from the disclosure 
of the US system of transna" onal communica" on and processing of (commercial) personal data for 
security purposes to the project of a European equivalent system. Taking stock of the E.U.-U.S. harsh 
debate on this aﬀ air, we argue that the main cri" cal surveillance issue of the TFTP is not where it is 
supposed to be. 
The paper begins with the presenta" on of US media disclosure of the TFTP, the role of SWIFT, and 
an a  empt to put into context the issue of “secondary use” of personal data regarding the rela" onship 
between security and privacy. Then, I try to show the very func" oning of the TFTP and, above all, how its 
modali" es of ﬁ nancial surveillance via technology of databases do not block or oppose to mobility but 
operate and run through this la  er one. Ul" mately, close analysis of European reac" ons a& er the TFTP 
disclosure and then the transatlan" c nego" a" ons on E.U.-U.S. TFTP agreement allows to say more about 
the state of European security integra" on. Thus, drawing upon primary sources and interviews at the 
European level, I ques" on the increased access to and use of non-state databases for State purposes.
I. S%*&+."-3 U4%: C&55%-*0"$ C&56"+3’4 D","#"4%4 '&- C&/+,%--,%--&-04, 
P/-6&4%4
While preven" on is clearly presented as the ul" mate goal of counter-terrorism and also administra" ve 
subpoenas and programs such as the TFTP, this stance refers to a speciﬁ c form of preven" on. Indeed, 
preven" on here does not ﬁ t into the classical understanding in terms of sensi" za" on and a  empt to 
address the root causes of criminal or poli" cal violence. Moreover, preven" on here does not correspond 
to another classical form of preven" on, which is deterrence to the extent that it is diﬃ  cult to look for 
such deterrent func" on from a program that has been conceived as an “invisible tool” for the general 
public. Thus, the TFTP highlights the current signiﬁ cance of a third meaning that it is the proac" ve form 
of preven" on in which the ra" onale is to “act before the other,” to prevent poten" al harmful events 
from happening (Bigo 2006). This par" cular logic of preven" on exceeds tradi" onal prac" ces of criminal 
inves" ga" on and the framework of criminal jus" ce because it is not limited to ﬁ nding and prosecu" ng 
criminals before they reoﬀ end. Access to informa" on is not only authorized when a crime has been 
already commi  ed to the extent that preventa" ve transfer of data is privileged. Oﬃ  cial requirements of 
retrieving a maximum of informa" on are less focused on ﬁ nding evidence to prosecute and punish than 
on amassing intelligence to pre-emp" vely disrupt and incapacitate (McCulloch and Pickering 2009).
I.1. Media Disclosure of the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunica" on describes itself as a “member-
owned coopera" ve through which the ﬁ nancial world conducts its business opera" ons with speed, 
certainty and conﬁ dence.”3 In other words, SWIFT is the main worldwide messaging service dedicated 
to the facilita" on of interna" onal ﬁ nancial transfer. 239 banks from 15 countries created this Belgium-
based coopera" ve in 1973 in order to subs" tute the telex with a presumably secure and reliable 
2. See European Commission Road map 2001 on the current project of a European TFTP: h  p://ec.europa.eu/governance/
impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_home_003_terrorist_ﬁ nancing_tracking_en.pdf
3. See www.swi& .com 
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means of transmi*  ng ﬁ nancial instruc" ons between ins" tu" ons. This company is now controlled by 
2,200 shareholders amongst which the biggest banks in the world. It provides standardized messaging 
services and interface so& ware to over 9,500 banking organiza" ons and other ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons in 
209 countries. It has acquired a kind of systemic character, as a key infrastructure of the interna" onal 
ﬁ nancial system (Banque na" onale de Belgique 2005). In 2011, SWIFT processed an average of 17 
million messages on a daily basis for a total number of more than 4 billion messages in 2010.4 According 
to oﬃ  cial assessment, the SWIFT network channels about 80% of the electronic value transfers around 
the world (Council of the European Union 2007:2). Thus, many ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons use the SWIFTNet 
FIN service everyday for the worldwide transfer of messages pertaining to ﬁ nancial transfers between 
ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons. Over the course of 2006, a secondary use of its role as intermediary and payment 
system hub leads it to be publically indicted in what would come to be known as the “SWIFT aﬀ air.” 
On June 23rd, 2006, the New York Times disclosed the existence of a conﬁ den" al ﬁ nancial surveillance 
program ini" ated by the American government in the a& ermath of September 11th, 2001 (The New 
York Times 2006a). Poin" ng out the abuses that could result from the scope of this program, the long 
ar" cle revealed the central place of SWIFT in this “scandal. For more than four years, the American 
authori" es had secretly accessed the messages passing through the “central nervous system of the 
global banking industry” (ibid.) to trace the ﬁ nancial transac" ons of individuals suspected of terrorism. 
With the New York Times having clearly taken it upon itself to act as “whistleblower” (on this no" on, 
see Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999), other papers decided to follow its lead and at the same " me 
revealed that SWIFT had transferred copies of interbank messages coming from all part of the world 
(The Los Angeles Times 2006; The Washington Post 2006a; The Wall Street Journal 2006). The same day, 
two American lawyers launched a suit in order to take the business to court for viola" ng their right to 
privacy (Köppel 2009:16-17). Once opened, the content of a SWIFT message concerning the payment 
of a bank client does indeed contain the amount of transac" on, the currency, the date, the name of the 
originator’s bank and the recipient client. It also provides informa" on about the beneﬁ ciary and the 
ordering customer such as name, account number, address, na" onal iden" ﬁ ca" on number and other 
personal data (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009; Commission de la protec" on de la vie 
privée (Royaume de Belgique) 2007).
The reac" ons and reports that followed this public revela" on contributed further informa" on 
as well as a few correc" ons but ul" mately conﬁ rmed most of the facts that had been presented in 
connec" on with the US Program. This program began almost immediately a& er September 11th, 2001, 
and given that the consent of the American Congress had not been a prerequisite of its applica" on, 
it does not seem excessive to describe it as “secret” except for specialized communi" es working on 
terrorist ﬁ nancing issues and few members of the Congress. A division of the Treasury Department, the 
Oﬃ  ce of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) jus" ﬁ ed its ac" on by reference to American statutory mandates 
(men" on is made of The Interna" onal Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 and The United Na" ons 
Par" cipa" on Act of 1945) and the execu" ve order 13224 authorizing the Department of the Treasury – 
in coordina" on with other federal agencies – to “use all appropriate measures to iden" fy, track down 
and pursue” terrorist groups and their supporters (US Department of the Treasury 2006b). Using this 
legal basis, OFAC made do with issuing subpoenas that systema" cally constrained SWIFT to extract and 
transmit copies of messages requested on the basis of shared criteria (mainly dates and countries). 
Moreover, US Authori" es have quickly described the TFTP – a& er the media disclosure – as a powerful 
inves" ga" ve tool allowing for the genera" on of leads as well as for the iden" ﬁ ca" on and capture of 
“terrorists” and their ﬁ nanciers. But beyond a simple exercise to jus" fy the legality and added value 
of its program, the Bush administra" on above all deplored the a*  tude of the press, s" gma" zing it for 
having caused unpardonable harm to na" onal security. This extremely cri" cal stance would con" nue to 
deepen in the days following the revela" ons of the New York Times, giving rise to a genuine “reversal 
of the scandalous accusa" on against the accuser” (de Blic and Lemieux 2005:17).
4. See www.swi& .com 
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In short order, it was no longer the generalized surveillance program that was called into ques" on 
but rather the public act that revealed it. The ini" al scandal proved to have only been a brief opening 
sequence for what would become the “SWIFT aﬀ air” (On the game by means of which scandals are 
transformed into aﬀ airs, see Lemieux 2007). Republican Congressman Peter T. King (chair of the House 
Homeland Security Commi  ee) went so far as to demand that an inquiry be opened and criminal 
proceedings ini" ated against the New York Times, accusing it of “treachery” in " mes of war (The 
Washington Post 2006b). Although other poli" cians did not share this point of view,5 the virulence of 
poli" cal (and also in some cases public) reac" ons ﬁ nally pushed Byron Calame (the New York paper’s 
mediator) to jus" fy the ar" cle’s publica" on. In an opinion column dated July 2nd, 2006, Calame began 
by pu*  ng the secret nature of the surveillance program into perspec" ve, underscoring the fact that 
it had been men" oned as early as 2002 in a public report from the United Na" ons (The New York 
Times 2006b6). From there, he proceeded to acknowledge that discre" on is of course a vital element 
in informa" on-gathering opera" ons but pointed out that this should not exclude supervision by 
elected representa" ves and claimed that weak supervision by Congress jus" ﬁ ed public discussion of a 
temporary emergency measure that had become permanent (ibid.).
From this point of view, the par" cular example of the TFTP echoes the general issue of emergency 
measures deemed temporary but which tend to become de facto permanent. With reference to 
counter-terrorism prac" ces, the situa" on of “temporary permanence” is historically well known (see 
for instance Donohue 1999; 2001). Other current prac" ces have been cri" cized for similar reasons such 
as blacklis" ng and asset-freezing measures (i.e. the United Na" ons “terrorist lists” program). Mar" n 
Scheinin – UN special rapporteur on the promo" on and protec" on of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism – has expressed concern that such supposedly temporary 
administra" ve measures turn out to be indeﬁ nite (UN General Assembly 2006). Regarding the ﬁ nancial 
aspect of counter-terrorism, the blacklis" ng and freezing approach is related to the preven" ve 
framework. While implementa" on of oﬃ  cial terrorist lists also responds to a dual logic of deterrence 
and poli" cal spectacle (providing reassurance via visible state ini" a" ve, Edelman 1988), the very design 
of this approach is clearly preven" ve. The public designa" on of groups and individuals as suspected 
terrorists on the one hand, the freezing of their ﬁ nancial assets on the other hand, fall into the purpose 
of pre-emp" ve disrup" on. Such proscrip" on cons" tutes a preven" ve interven" on to the extent that 
listed en" " es have o& en received no trial and most of them are not even judicially prosecuted. The 
aim is less to condemn guilty par" es than to incapacitate suspects. Blacklisted persons are suspects of 
“terrorism” following an execu" ve decision, on the basis of intelligence outside judicial review. In other 
words, oﬃ  cial blacklists “circumvent the ‘normal’ criminal procedure by placing the power to designate 
an individual or group as ‘terrorist’ in the hands of the execu" ve and then preven" ng na" onal courts 
from exercising judicial review of those designa" ons. This eﬀ ect is not simply an unforeseen by-
product of the blacklis" ng regimes, but rather its raison d’être” (Hayes and Sullivan 2011:82). Hence, 
while conﬁ sca" on of funds is related to a judicial criminal charge, asset-freezing is linked to a simple 
administra" ve measure. However, the diﬀ erence between the permanence of a puni" ve decision and 
the temporariness of an administra" ve decision might be blurred in prac" ce for individuals who have 
been blacklisted for more than ﬁ ve or even nine years (ibid.; Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues 2009).
Michael Levi and David Wall also remind that once in place in the name of security emergency, 
mass surveillance technologies become “ins" tu" onalized and very hard poli" cally to dismantle” (Levi 
and Wall 2004:210). Hence, “temporary permanence” mainly refers to the phenomenon of “ratchet 
eﬀ ect” which underlines the extreme diﬃ  culty to reverse processes once they have been launched, 
even in the name of an excep" onal situa" on of violence (Bigo and Gui  et 2004). Furthermore, this 
5. Arlen Specter (President of the Senate Judicial Commi  ee), for example, held that: “On the basis of the newspaper ar" cle, 
I think that it is premature to call for legal ac" on against the New York Times, just like I think that it is premature to say that 
the administra" on is completely right” (The Washington Post 2006b).
6. The report men" oned without further references being: Security Council, Third Report of the Follow-up Group in Applica! on 
of Paragraph 10 of Resolu! on 1390, December 17th, 2002, point 31, p. 12.
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phenomenon raises addi" onal ques" ons when it is associated with security prac" ces that have been 
ini" ally implemented in government secrecy, such as the TFTP, simply framed by execu" ve-centered 
government and SWIFT standards. Without media disclosure, the TFTP would have remained under the 
radar of public or congressional commi  ee scru" ny.
Several months later, however, the public controversy would push Byron Calame to make his 
public mea culpa, expressing regret that the July opinion piece had been published and acknowledging 
the apparent legality of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program as well as the absence of evidence 
demonstra" ng that personal data collected under its aegis had been misused (The New York Times 
2006c). Finally, in October 2007, the suit brought by the two lawyers on June 23rd, 2006, was dismissed, 
the judge having concluded that the plain" ﬀ s did not oﬀ er suﬃ  cient evidence to support the claim that 
their personal data had been directly targeted by the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.7 The federal 
government was in any case one step ahead, announcing in August 2007 that it would call upon the legal 
tool of State Secret Privilege to halt any and all legal ac" on against SWIFT (The New York Times 2007).
The framing of the US debate on the TFTP is highly interes" ng with regards to “surveillance studies” 
(see for instance Lyon 2007) and the security/privacy debate. Although the disclosure of the SWIFT 
case raised ques" ons and denuncia" ons in terms of government excess of surveillance, it is not as 
easy to formulate what is at stake in it. Indeed, it is extremely diﬃ  cult to iden" fy with the poten" al 
vic" ms in this case as the use to which transmi  ed informa" on is put is unknown, and the eﬀ ects of 
their revela" on are not tangible. Given that the iden" ty of the vic" ms is unclear, the damage caused to 
them uncertain and responsibility for it profoundly intertwined and diﬃ  cult to discern, mobiliza" on in 
the SWIFT aﬀ air struggles to take root or, for that ma  er, even to provoke public anger. Moreover, one 
can easily imagine that even if the two plain" ﬀ s succeeded to prove the government’s access of their 
(SWIFT) data, the court would have rejected the lawsuit because the two lawyers could not prove any 
“admissible harm.” Indeed, although Daniel Solove does not develop his arguments on TFTP as such, 
he studied similar cases of informa" on dissemina" on which were not necessarily linked to counter-
terrorism purposes (Solove 2007). 
For example, a& er the September 11 a  acks, several airlines gave their passenger 
records to federal agencies in direct viola" on of their privacy policies [counter-
terrorism purposes] [...] A similar problem surfaces in another case, Smith v. 
Chase Manha  an Bank. A group of plain" ﬀ s sued Chase Manha  an Bank for 
selling customer informa" on to third par" es in viola" on of its privacy policy, which 
stated that informa" on would remain conﬁ den" al [commercial purposes] (ibid.) 
Both groups of plain" ﬀ s were ul" mately dismissed but Solove argues that court rulings reveal less the 
absence of privacy problems than the diﬃ  culty with the legal system in “recognizing harms that do not 
result in embarrassment, humilia" on, or physical or psychological injury” (ibid.).
Cases such as the two examples or the TFTP refer to the problem of secondary use regarding 
informa" on dissemina" on and informa" on processing. “Secondary use involves data collected for one 
purpose being use for an unrelated purpose without people’s consent” (ibid.; see also Solove 2006). 
Hence, the US Treasury has processed SWIFT data for purposes far beyond the scope of their original 
gathering. Solove acknowledges that such privacy problem frequently does not give rise to material 
(i.e. ﬁ nancial or physical) nor psychological injuries but, according to him, it is s" ll harmful despite this 
fact. Hence, the harmful dimension tends to be a structural one to the extent that it concerns not so 
much par" cular individuals than popula" ons as a whole. The harm is structural because it consists in 
power imbalance between SWIFT and its indirect users (i.e. banking customers) and between ci" zens 
and their government (and even between US government and non US ci" zens nor US permanent 
7. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Ian Walker and Stephen Kruse, Plain! ﬀ s, v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRI, Defendant, 517F. 
Supp. 2d 801, 2007, pp.517-525v (Köppel 2009).
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residents).8 First of all, individuals are de facto put in a powerless posi" on vis-à-vis SWIFT and SWIFT 
direct users (i.e. individuals’ banks) because their data has been shared and processed in a way they 
could not know. As Solove states for his example regarding airlines passengers, the issue is not to 
ques" on whether or not people know privacy policy of companies such as SWIFT. The issue is to 
understand that in any case there is a “social value in ensuring that companies adhere to established 
limits on the way they use personal informa" on. Otherwise, any stated limits become meaningless, 
and companies have discre" on to boundlessly use data” (Solove 2007). Secondly, individuals are also 
le&  in a powerless posi" on in connec" on with their rela" onships with the US government. Indeed, US 
Treasury Department and US federal agencies have processed SWIFT personal informa" on without 
ci" zens’ knowledge or involvement, and without Congress oversight. Hence, individuals’ powerless 
posi" on is not so much related to the very existence of the TFTP than it is related to a mechanism of 
oversight and issues of public accountability to the extent that this existence was kept secret for the 
popula" on and the Congress (as an ins" tu" on) for ﬁ ve years.
This focus on the problema" c of power imbalance reﬂ ects an underrated facet of the security/
privacy debate regarding the TFTP disclosure which would deserve further analysis. Such secondary 
use of personal data raises speciﬁ c privacy problems although there is no iden" ﬁ ca" on of individual 
cases of emo" onal or material injuries and that many people could state they have “nothing to 
hide” regarding what they might consider as non sensi" ve ﬁ nancial personal data. This problem of 
secondary use ques" ons the rela" onships between businesses and end customers on the one hand, 
rela" onships between execu" ve power and ci" zens on the other hand, and how programs such as the 
TFTP aﬀ ect social structure by altering these rela" onships. As security issues, privacy ones should also 
be interpreted and analyzed in terms of collec" ve and societal interests (Solove 2007).
I.2. SWIFT, Mirror and Black Box: How Does TFTP Work?
Under the TFTP, the Treasury Department’s Oﬃ  ce of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has thus issued 
administra" ve subpoenas (“inves" ga" ve tools”) requiring SWIFT’s US opera" ng centre to provide 
access to ﬁ nancial transac" on records yielded by their US server. To be clear, the provision of a highly 
signiﬁ cant amount of US-stored messaging data does not mean that US Treasury has only accessed 
to US-related transac" ons. OFAC representa" ves have also accessed to interbank messages between 
countries that are not the United States and with personal data that are not linked to US ci" zens or US 
en" " es. This access to worldwide ﬁ nancial data stored by SWIFT has been technically feasible because 
the company runs two opera" ng centers for its ordinary messaging ac" vi" es9. One is located in the 
E.U. (in the Netherlands) and the other in the U.S. At these centers, the coopera" ve stores its millions 
of daily messages – that are transmi  ed everyday via its “SWIFTNet FIN” service – for commercial 
purposes, mostly as part of their service to customers “in case of disputes between ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons 
or data loss” (Ar" cle 29 Data Protec" on Working Party 2006). All messages are kept for a period of 124 
days in the EU and US servers that “mirror” the ﬁ nancial data in order to provide “backup,” should 
one of the servers crash.10 Thus, SWIFT messages are ini" ally collected for a limited amount of " me 
as a classical rou" ne prac" ce to ensure commercial con" nuity in case of failure regarding one of the 
opera" ng centers. Consequently, the US actors have issued orders on SWIFT with the aim of accessing 
and processing messages of interbank transac" ons stored by the company for business purposes.
Although the TFTP seems to be a speciﬁ c project, it is part of a general trend of using databases 
held by commercial companies for counter-terrorism purposes.11 There has been a con" nuous pressure 
8. We will see that the US TFTP does not only concern, by far, American people.
9. We will see that this state of aﬀ airs has slightly changed since January 2010.
10. “Mirroring” cons" tutes a form of data processing meaning that the two servers “provide an exact copy of the data held by 
the other” (European Parliament 2007a).
11. Although it is not perfectly similar, another famous case is the PNR (Passenger Name Records) involving personal data 
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to access personal data and to use it for aims that are diﬀ erent from the ones it ini" ally was collected 
for. The US Treasury’s administra" ve subpoenas have enabled this kind of unilateral “exchange” of 
informa" on stored in commercial databases. These “inves" ga" ve tools” are imbued with a preven" ve 
approach focusing on the proac" ve surveillance of ﬂ ows. According to SWIFT, at the end of 2006, it had 
received and complied to 64 subpoenas since September 11. It should be men" oned that the Treasury’s 
searches on SWIFT data follow two steps. First of all, their requests are not individualized but quite 
general. Indeed, US SWIFT’s opera" ng centre has not the technical capacity to respond to targeted 
queries because of the codiﬁ ed structure of SWIFT messages. Hence, the broad scope of queries is 
deﬁ ned in the subpoenas and it is “materially, territorially and in " me very wide: these subpoenas are 
issued for any transac" ons which relate or may relate to terrorism, relate to X number of countries and 
jurisdic" ons, on a date, or ‘from … to …’ dates ranging from one to several weeks, within and outside the 
U.S.” (Ar" cle 29 Data Protec" on Working Party 2006); “The SWIFT isn’t made in the way that you can say 
I want M. X’s transfers on the 16th of November, the 8 of June and 9 of August. It’s not the system, you can 
always get a bulk” (Interview with European Oﬃ  cial 2008). In concrete terms, the Treasury Department 
does not directly extract individualized data pertaining to a speciﬁ c suspect. The broad “subpoenaed 
messages” are provided by the SWIFT opera" ng centre in the U.S. and transferred into a “US Treasury 
black box.” Secondly, US authori" es use their own designed so& ware in order to automa" cally decipher 
SWIFT messages and to launch name searches within their searchable database (the so-called “black 
box”) (Commission de la protec" on de la vie privée (Royaume de Belgique) 2006a; General Secretariat 
of the Council of the EU 2009). Thus, they verify whether speciﬁ c names appear in messages. 
As a result, concerning the processing, the Treasury Department has asserted that “data provided 
by SWIFT is searched to extract only informa" on that is related to an iden" ﬁ ed, pre-exis" ng terrorism 
inves" ga" on” (OJEU 2007). Despite widespread concern about data mining procedures, US authori" es 
have cer" ﬁ ed that it is not a “ﬁ shing expedi" on in the black box” (ibid.; Interviews with European Oﬃ  cials 
2007-2008) and that there is no data mining nor automated proﬁ ling.12 According to Under Secretary 
Stuart Levey, the data cannot be searched when there is no “terrorism nexus.” Treasury Department 
representa" ves underline that US counter-terrorism analysts have ul" mately opened and seen less than 
one percent of the subset of SWIFT messages stored in the searchable black box (ibid.). Consequently, 
the TFTP does not involve a surveillance opera" ng on the basis of automated proﬁ ling aiming at the 
iden" ﬁ ca" on of “popula" ons at risk” through recogni" on pa  ern tools. As opposed to technologies 
developed to detect pre-established pa  erns of suspect behavior or suspicious transac" ons, it would 
only involve localiza" on technologies focusing on suspect individuals or suspect en" " es. Beyond any 
doubt, the TFTP exempliﬁ es one of the technical forms taken by (ﬁ nancial) intelligence through databases 
and surveillance models based on the tracing of ﬂ ows. According to this understanding, security can only 
be promoted provided the traces le&  by ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows are followed. Contemporary ﬁ nancial intelligence 
is precisely associated with the willingness to take advantage of informa" on technologies in order to 
iden" fy, monitor and so manage the ﬂ ows. To the extent that they promote fast, real-" me transac" ons 
almost all over the world, technological developments would also enhance surveillance by leaving 
“electronic traces” which enable “money trails” in and out of sovereign territories (Levi and Wall 2004).
Prac" ces of control hence feed on ﬁ nancial circula" on, rather than a  emp" ng to curtail it. Indeed, 
control and surveillance at a distance suppose mobility without which they would lose their cri" cal enabler. 
Thus, the US SWIFT server turns out to be one of the crucial pieces of an “assemblage” of mobility 
control. As a transna" onal database, the ﬁ nancial transac" on records provided by SWIFT are claimed 
to allow for the iden" ﬁ ca" on and loca" on of suspects as well as for the monitoring and analysis of 
their rela" onships. In the immediate a& ermath of media disclosure, the US Treasury has immediately 
transfer of passengers of transatlan" c ﬂ ights (see Salter 2008; Mitsilegas 2008). 
12. Automated proﬁ ling is the result of a data mining process, which is “a procedure by which large databases are mined 
by means of algorithms for pa  erns of correla" ons between data” (Hildebrandt 2008:18). In other words, with regards to 
counter-terrorism, “data mining involves crea" ng proﬁ les by collec" ng and combining personal data, and analyzing it for 
par" cular pa  erns of behaviour deemed to be suspicious” (Solove 2008:343). 
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jus" ﬁ ed the TFTP by alleging that it has enabled the localiza" on of suspects and the ﬁ nding of 
addresses or links between known and “unknown terrorists” (US Department of the Treasury 2006a).13 
Consequently, the TFTP deploys mobile forms of surveillance that can be conceptualized as a kind of 
localiza" on technology – tracking ﬁ nancial movements of suspects – which w ould allow for “social 
network analyses” (de Goede 2008) to map individual connec" ons. 
“Following the money” is one of the most valuable sources of informa" on that 
we have to iden" fy and locate the networks of terrorists and their supporters. 
If a terrorist associate whom we are watching sends or receives money from 
another person, we know that there’s a link between the two individuals. And, 
while terrorist supporters may use code names on the phone, when they send 
or receive money through the banking system, they o& en provide informa" on 
that yields the kind of concrete leads that can advance an inves" ga" on. For 
these reasons, counter-terrorism oﬃ  cials place a heavy premium on ﬁ nancial 
intelligence. As the 9/11 Commission staﬀ  pointed out – and as Chairman 
Hamilton tes" ﬁ ed before this Commi  ee – “following the money to iden" fy 
terrorist opera" ves and sympathizers provides a par" cularly powerful tool 
in the ﬁ ght against terrorist groups. Use of this tool almost always remains 
invisible to the general public, but it is a cri" cal part of the overall campaign 
against al Qaeda.” The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program was just such an 
invisible tool. (US Treasury Department Oﬃ  ce of Public Aﬀ airs 2006)
Nevertheless, the massive access to personal data by US authori" es has o& en been met with 
cri" cism and doubt. Besides the exclusively American aspect of the debate, the SWIFT aﬀ air is also and 
above all marked by its transatlan" c dimension. The following sec" on analyses the numerous tensions 
and ambigui" es revealed by the “SWIFT case” in order to highlight what is at stake in transatlan" c 
counter-terrorism rela" onships and what the TFTP tells us on intra-European tensions and European 
security integra" on.
II. T-"+4",$"+,0* A5#0;"$%+*% "+. E/-&6%"+ T%+40&+4
As soon as the existence of the TFTP became public, the disclosure of massive and long-term 
intercep" on of bank transfer data from SWIFT by US services produced a poli" cal and legal shockwave 
in the E.U. The press reports basically claimed that US authori" es had access to informa" on on millions 
of EU ci" zens. Due to the programme’s secre" ve character, the U.S. appeared to have successfully 
forestalled possible nego" a" ons with European ins" tu" ons and secretly monitored European 
popula" on’s (and others’) ﬁ nancial transac" ons during ﬁ ve years. 
II.1. European Union: A Unitary Actor on the “SWIFT Aﬀ air”? Not at All
The revela" ons concerning the ﬁ nancial surveillance program were picked up in Europe where 
part of the media sphere was quick to report them (The Guardian 2006; Le Monde 2006; Le Soir 
2006), calling into ques" on the collabora" on between SWIFT and the American Treasury from the 
perspec" ve of European legisla" on concerning the protec" on of personal data. Located in Belgium, the 
13. We will see that two oﬃ  cial reports for the E.U. have insisted, since 2008, on the value of TFTP-derived informa" on with 
several examples.
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coopera" ve company is actually subject to European law. In July 2006, it was revealed that European 
ins" tu" ons, such as the European Parliament and the European Commission, had not been informed 
of the existence of this US security measure claimed to contribute to the common ﬁ ght against 
“terrorism.” The European Parliament strongly regre  ed that it had not been informed of the secret 
agreement between the global messaging company and the US administra" on (European Parliament 
2006, 2007b). Referring to the journalis" c inquiries and to a complaint lodged by the organiza" on 
Privacy Interna" onal,14 the European Parliament adopted a resolu" on on this subject on July 6th, 
2006, less than 15 days a& er the ﬁ rst informa" on was divulged. There, the Members of European 
Parliament (henceforth MEPs) expressed their disappointment at having been kept in the dark and 
worried over the “crea" on of a climate marked by eroding respect for privacy and the protec" on of 
data” (ibid.). Given the crucial role played by the SWIFT network for European banks, the fact that it 
had been put under surveillance heralded massive access on the part of American authori" es to the 
conﬁ den" al informa" on of millions of European ci" zens without the consent of EU ins" tu" ons. The 
text of the resolu" on moreover insisted on the issue of economic sovereignty, denouncing the danger 
(at least theore" cal) of large scale economic and industrial espionage resul" ng from the unsupervised 
communica" on of this data to third countries (in this case, the United States).
The general secretariat of the European Council and the Commission as a whole did not appear 
to have more knowledge on the subject ma  er than the MEPs, they learned of the “SWIFT ma  er” 
through the media. As claimed by numerous Commission oﬃ  cials, there was a “poli" cal shock” for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the TFTP notably involves personal data collected in Europe over several 
years, thus allowing for a par" cularly intrusive form of surveillance. On the other hand, although there 
are some diﬀ erences in prac" ces and discourses, the E.U. clearly claims to have the same poli" cal goal 
as its transatlan" c partner in the ﬁ ght against “terrorism.” Thus, “it is quite surprising for a partner 
to read newspapers and to hear that the other partner is combing through the ﬁ les of a European 
company (SWIFT) for a counter-terrorism purpose without informing the other” (interview with 
European Oﬃ  cial, October 2007). The Belgian data protec" on authority, the “Ar" cle 29 data protec" on 
working party” (henceforth G 29)15 and the European Data Protec" on Supervisor (henceforth EDPS)16 
also expressed serious concern and stressed the secret character of the US program. Accordingly, in 
spite of US ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial statements on eﬃ  ciency and legal safeguards, the TFTP has raised skep" cism 
and concern within various EU ins" tu" ons to which, according to oﬃ  cials discussing the very logic 
of the program, no other choice was le&  – just a& er media disclosure – than to trust US authori" es. 
“The US Terrorist Financing Tracking Program is a very secret project, we don’t get any access and I 
don’t know what the added value, or the success factor of that is; I am not sure what they are doing 
really, we had a lot of diﬃ  cul" es with the U.S. when we were discussing the ‘SWIFT case’ to get a real 
picture of this program, because you can say whatever you want, but are they really restric" ng the 
program to terrorism ﬁ nancing and terrorism a  acks? There will always be a discrepancy between 
what they are saying and what they are doing with the informa" on. We have to take what they say for 
granted because we have no access, we have no insight informa" on” (Interview with European oﬃ  cial, 
September 2007). Both quota" ons represent a kind of ideal-type of the European oﬃ  cials’ discourse 
14. Star" ng in June 2006, this associa" on for the defence of human rights, which specializes in monitoring government and 
business surveillance prac" ces, lodged a complaint with bodies overseeing the protec" on of data and privacy in 33 countries. 
See www.privacyinterna" onal.org 
15. Created by Ar" cle 29 of the 1995 European data protec" on direc" ve, this working group brings together representa" ves 
of each of the Member State’s independent na" onal data protec" on authori" es. The mission entrusted to the G 29 consists 
in contribu" ng to the elabora" on of European norms by adop" ng recommenda" ons, rendering opinions on the level of 
protec" on in third countries and advising the European Commission on any project having an impact on the rights and 
liber" es of physical persons in regards to the treatment of personal data.
16. The oﬃ  ce of the European Data Protec" on Auditor was created by (EC) Ruling no.45/2001 rela" ng to the protec" on of 
physical persons in regards to the treatment of personal data by community ins" tu" ons and agencies and the free circula" on 
of data. An independent ins" tu" on, its objec" ve is above all to oversee the way in which personal data is processed by the 
EU administra" on.
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following disclosure of the US program. However, such general discourse does not mean so much that 
all European actors were unaware of the TFTP than main European ins" tu" ons were simply out of the 
loop.
The inves" ga" ons carried out by data protec" on authori" es show that the Central Banks of 
the Group of Ten countries (G 10 Group17) knew of these data transfers by 2002 (Commission de la 
protec" on de la vie privée (Royaume de Belgique) 2006a; Ar" cle 29 Data Protec" on Working Party 
2006 ; European Data Protec" on Supervisor 2007). Given the company’s global reach, the G 10 Group 
had set up an oversight mechanism focusing “primarily on ensuring that SWIFT has eﬀ ec" ve control 
and processes to avoid a risk to the ﬁ nancial stability and the soundness of ﬁ nancial infrastructures” 
(European Data Protec" on Supervisor 2007). Indeed, the European Central Bank (ECB) belongs to 
the group of ten central banks which supervise the ac" vi" es of SWIFT. As such, it had been aware 
of the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program since 2002. However, the ECB did not contact European 
authori" es to keep them informed. It jus" ﬁ ed this omission in the name of a strict interpreta" on of 
the G 10 Group’s secrecy rules, arguing that the data-transfer and breaches to data protec" on rules 
were not within the remit of its oversight mechanism. Thus, according to this ins" tu" on, the rules 
of conﬁ den" ality and the limited ﬁ eld of ac" on inherent to its supervisory role did not allow it to 
pass on informa" on to European data protec" on authori" es nor to put pressure on SWIFT to do so. 
This restric" ve interpreta" on was seriously challenged by the European Data Protec" on Supervisor 
(ibid.).Moreover, the main ambivalence came from within the European Council. Much more than a 
simple legal and technical aﬀ air, the SWIFT case was undeniably accompanied by a poli" cal dimension. 
Having learnt of the existence of the surveillance program via the press, both the European Parliament 
and the European Commission experienced it as a profound poli" cal shock exacerbated by the silence 
of such ins" tu" ons as the ECB (interview with European Commission oﬃ  cials, Brussels, December 2007 
and May 2008). In December 2006, the Belgian Privacy Commission issued a second opinion, urging 
European governments to not remain silent given the “jus" ﬁ ed grounds of protest.”18 Nevertheless, 
the unanimous cri" cism of data protec" on authori" es came up against the apparent indiﬀ erence of 
Member States. In lieu of a diploma" c condemna" on, some of them – including France and the United 
Kingdom – on the contrary hastened to tes" fy before the EU Council so as to the veracity of American 
claims regarding the program’s usefulness for ﬁ gh" ng terrorism, including in Europe (interview with 
European Commission oﬃ  cials, Brussels 2007).
First of all, some oﬃ  cials of the G 10 group have decided to inform their Jus" ce and Interior Ministries 
about the existence of the TFTP (Interviews with European commission and Council oﬃ  cials 2008). 
Secondly, the intelligence services of some Member States had indeed received informa" on from the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program via informal bilateral rela" ons all along.19 To some extent, this situa" on 
illustrates the absence of prac" cal coordina" on between Member States at EU level in the ﬁ eld of the ﬁ ght 
against terrorism and its ﬁ nancial aspects. Opera" onal coopera" on tends to be mostly bilateral. Some 
Member States’ rela" onships to non-EU states play a signiﬁ cant role, especially with the U.S. The ﬁ nancial 
intelligence extracted from SWIFT via the TFTP has been thus exchanged in an informal and bilateral 
environment precluding any formal consulta" on of the “E.U. 27” and of the European arrangements. 
Seen in this light, while the TFTP illustrates US rela" onships with individual Member States, it mainly 
highlights the state of aﬀ airs regarding European security coordina" on and integra" on.
17. The G 10 Group is composed of the Na" onal Bank of Belgium, Bank of Canada, Deutsche Bundesbank, European Central 
Bank, Banque de France, Banca d’Italia, Bank of Japan, De Nederlandsche Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss Na" onal Bank, Bank 
of England and the Federal Reserve System (USA), represented by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
18. “The observa" on that, for years, the personal data of their ci" zens had been the object of a large-scale and hitherto 
uncontrolled and unilateral inves" ga" on by the authori" es of a state with which close collabora" on takes place in itself 
cons" tutes jus" ﬁ ed grounds of protest.” Commission de la protec" on de la vie privée (Royaume de Belgique) (2006b).
19. As Gilles de Kerchove (European coordinator in the ﬁ ght against terrorism) indicated during a public conference, Challenge 
Interna! onal Conference: The Exchange and Storage of Data, Sciences Po, Paris, 10-11 October 2008.
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II.2. Privacy and Economic Sovereignty: European Concerns and SWIFT Re-Architecture
With reference to their harsh cri" cs on the US program, MEPs and data protec" on agencies have 
mostly insisted on privacy and economic issues. Beyond the issue of SWIFT’s and ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons’ 
(such as the European Central Bank’s) co-responsibility, they have mainly emphasized the viola" ons of 
fundamental European principles regarding data protec" on. The legal analysis of the la  er is beyond 
the scope of this ar" cle (see Gonzales Fuster, de Hert and Gutwirt 2008). It is however worth men" oning 
that problems concerning the level of protec" on for the interna" onal transfer of personal data are 
involved, as well as ques" ons pertaining to the guarantees for the transfer of data to a third country, 
the principle of propor" onality and necessity, transparency and independent control mechanisms of 
the data processing, the right for the ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons’ individual clients to be informed about how 
their personal data is processed and that US authori" es might have access to such data. Although US 
representa" ves have always denied any use of a data mining process, this speciﬁ c issue has remained a 
running concern for members of the European Parliament and data protec" on authori" es.
With the ma  er having been referred to them for judgment, the Belgian and European data 
protec" on authori" es made it their priority to deal with the aﬀ air. In September 2006, the Belgian 
Data Privacy Commission was the ﬁ rst to hand down an opinion. For the Commission, the crux of the 
issue turned on the role played by SWIFT in the transmission of personal data to the American Treasury 
Department. Its conclusion was free of all ambiguity: the systema" c, massive and secret nature of 
the prac" ces as well as the long dura" on of the eﬀ ort vis-à-vis the OFAC cons" tuted a viola" on of 
fundamental principles of the European legal order (Commission de la protec" on de la vie privée 
(Royaume de Belgique) 2006a). A public hearing was then held in early October 2006 by the European 
Parliament: it supplied Francis Vanbever (at the " me ﬁ nancial director of SWIFT) with an opportunity 
to present the company’s posi" on. Vanbever rejected the opinion of the Belgian authority and, 
underscoring the par" cular legal status of SWIFT and the limita" ons nego" ated with the Treasury,20 
challenged the claim that the company had commi  ed any breach of European legisla" on. Presen" ng 
itself as a vic" m of legal conﬂ ict caught in a vice between Belgian data protec" on laws and American 
an" terrorist laws, the SWIFT Company reiterated its call for transatlan" c dialogue on these issues. 
Yet, notwithstanding SWIFT’s eﬀ orts to present itself as the vic" m of compe" ng legal forms, the 
later opinions of the G 29 and the EDPS did not diﬀ er from the Belgian assessment. As a result of a 
concerted eﬀ ort, the G 29 opinion conﬁ rmed that infrac" ons had been commi  ed and condemned 
the circumven" on of “exis" ng mechanisms allowing for independent oversight of [ﬁ nancial] data 
processing” (Ar" cle 29 Data Protec" on Working Party 2006). Judging that this security-conscious use 
was dispropor" onate and incompa" ble with the original commercial aims of SWIFT data processing, 
the G 29 opinion held that this prac" ce was capable of having direct repercussions on the life of the 
individuals whose data was concerned. Also called into ques" on, European ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons – direct 
consumers of the SWIFTNet Fin service – were ordered to inform their clients of what had become 
of their personal data and the possibility that this informa" on had been accessed by the American 
authori" es. For the most part, they did this by way of inser" ng a box on their web page.
The Presidency of the European Council – held by Germany at the " me of the talks with the US 
Treasury in the ﬁ rst semester of 2007 – was par" cularly worried by US access to intra-European SWIFT 
data (interview with European oﬃ  cials, 2007). Many European oﬃ  cials shared this stance and had 
the feeling that they were not treated as real partners by US authori" es. The la  er have not seemed 
to accept the idea that the collabora" on that enables them to access data on European popula" ons 
20. Vanbever insisted on the safeguards obtained by SWIFT regarding the US storage of the subpoenaed data and added that 
“SWIFT has representa" ves on site at the Treasury. They review every query. They can stop any query in real " me if they are 
not sa" sﬁ ed that it is related to an ongoing inves" ga" on into terrorism ﬁ nancing” (European Parliament (Hearing) 2006).
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would have to be counter-balanced by a control on the part of the Europeans over their internal system 
and their use of this data.21
As a result, ques" ons pertaining to the use of the data collected through SWIFT triggered widespread 
concern in Europe over economic and industrial espionage. Eﬀ orts on the part of the Department of 
Treasury to trace interna" onal banking system transfers of funds to and from “terrorists” also give 
access to “informa" on on the economic ac" vi" es of the individuals and countries concerned” (European 
Parliament 2006). The European Parliament and the EDPS have con" nued to highlight a risk to economic 
sovereignty since a third country (the U.S.) could access data on the commercial transac" ons of 
European companies without safeguards on the purposes of the data-transfer. European authori" es 
thus complained about the danger of “func" on creep” from counter-terrorism to economic espionage. 
Finally, the data protec" on authori" es have argued that the type of viola" ons epitomized by the “SWIFT 
case” may threaten the ﬁ nancial stability of the payment system.22 This statement represents a quite 
ironic reversal of oﬃ  cial lines of argumenta" on on counter-terrorism since the data-transfer involving 
SWIFT is here deﬁ ned as illicit ﬂ ows undermining one of the oﬃ  cial aims of the ﬁ ght against terrorism 
ﬁ nancing. “Terrorism” is indeed perceived as a “threat to ﬁ nancial stability” (Basel Commi  ee on 
Banking Supervision 2002) and the preserva" on of the integrity of ﬁ nancial ins" tu" ons and the ﬁ nancial 
system is at the heart of counter-terrorism ﬁ nancing measures. The “SWIFT case” has hence been seen 
as a poten" ally counter-produc" ve opera" on to the extent that it would slip into a paradox in which it 
would risk to endanger one the referent object (i.e. ﬁ nancial system) that it claims to secure. 
Eventually an agreement was reached on the use of SWIFT data. During the ﬁ rst semester of 2007, 
the informal nego" a" ons exclusively involved the US Treasury Department, the European Commission 
(DG Jus" ce, Liberty and Security) and the German presidency of the European Council (through its 
Ministry of Finance) assisted by the Council Secretariat (mainly Gilles de Kerchove who was no yet the 
EU counter-terrorism coordinator). On June 28 of the same year, a set of unilateral commitments on 
the part of the US Treasury was disclosed as a result of the informal talks. “We did not need to have an 
oﬃ  cial interna" onal agreement. If we could avoid an interna" onal treaty, in other words if we could do 
something simpler it is be  er because interna" onal treaty is much more complicated than a unilateral 
representa" on” (interview with a European commission oﬃ  cial, March 2008). The so-called US 
“representa" ons” include “insurances” that SWIFT data be used strictly for counter-terrorism purposes 
with internal safeguards and data reten" on obliga" ons.23 They include above all the appointment of an 
“eminent European” by the European Commission in consulta" on with the United States Department 
of Treasury. The French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière was designated as the “eminent” person in 2008 
and mandated to exercise independent oversight over the use of SWIFT data in order to conﬁ rm that 
US commitments are eﬀ ec" vely met.24 
Finally, the deﬁ ni" ve opinion of the Belgian Privacy Commission (December 2008) seemed to 
mark the end point of the aﬀ air. This Commission had prolonged its inves" ga" ons over a two-year 
period and had made a 180-degree turn with regard to its ini" al, 2006 posi" ons (Privacy Protec" on 
Commission (Kingdom of Belgium) 2008). Any idea of legal proceedings against the coopera" ve society 
was abandoned since the decision concluded that the surveillance program was legal and that the 
data passed on by SWIFT had beneﬁ ted from adequate protec" on (ibid.). The Belgian authority in part 
21. Bigo, Didier. Unpublished working-paper, 2008.
22. “…the lack of compliance with data protec" on legisla" on may actually hamper also the ﬁ nancial stability of the payment 
system for at least two reasons: ﬁ rst of all, it could seriously aﬀ ect consumers trust in their banks; secondly, it might lead 
European data protec" on authori" es, as well as judicial authori" es, to use their enforcement powers to block the processing 
of personal data which are not in compliance with data protec" on law” (European Data Protec" on Supervisor 2007).
23. Terrorist Finance Tracking Program – Representa" ons of the United States Department of the Treasury, op. cit. Interviewees 
underline that data reten" on obliga" ons were signiﬁ cant part of the nego" a" ons because US authori" es wanted to retain 
data for 40 years while the agreement ﬁ nally imposes no more than ﬁ ve years (which is already a signiﬁ cant amount of " me).
24. The main conclusions of his ﬁ rst report, which were presented in February 2009, oﬃ  cially insisted on the US privacy 
safeguards and the value of the TFTP in the ﬁ ght against Terrorism, “notably in Europe” (Europa Press release 2009).
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jus" ﬁ ed this about-face with reference to what had un" l then been li  le known facts, even though 
it was above all the eﬀ orts to which SWIFT had consented since 2006 which implicitly supported 
what was, a priori, a surprising decision (for an interpreta" on of the strategy of the data protec" on 
authori" es, see Köppel 2009). In this respect, moreover, the ﬁ nal opinion only conﬁ rmed that advanced 
by its European counterparts beginning in October 2007. Under pressure once the existence of the US 
program had been made public, SWIFT had never fundamentally abandoned its defensive posture. 
In prac" ce, however, it resigned itself to modifying the technical architecture of its network in order 
to protect its reputa" on (SWIFT press release 2007). Star" ng in late 2007, these changes were very 
favorably received by data protec" on agencies which, claiming credit for them, spoke of the “end of 
the crisis” (Ar" cle 29 Data Protec" on Working Party 2007:1; CNIL 2007:23-24).
The restructuring of the SWIFT electronic message architecture came down to the implanta" on 
of a new opera" onal centre in Switzerland (scheduled for late 2009) so that the data from messages 
rela" ng to European transac" ons should remain in Europe from now on. The SWIFT board of directors 
decided to par" " on messaging services into two dis" nct zones, the “Transatlan" c zone” and the 
“European Zone” which is not limited to the E.U. The European messaging zone covers the European 
Economic Area (E.U. 27 + Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), Switzerland and territories associated 
with EU Member States. The transatlan" c messaging zone covers the U.S. and its territories. All other 
States are by default assigned to the la  er zone but they can request to be re-allocated to the European 
one. Therefore, the decision of re-architecture requires that each zone would have their proper pairs 
of opera" ng centers that gather data for each zone. With regards to this re-architecture, the rou" ne 
process of data mirroring con" nues but it becomes intra-zone to the extent that messages from the 
European Zone would only be stored in Netherlands and Switzerland. In other words, intra-European 
traﬃ  c would be strictly kept in SWIFT European opera" ng centers, no such data would be mirrored 
with the US branch server anymore. At this moment, the US TFTP would exclusively concern messages 
to or from the transatlan" c zone and would no longer include those emi  ed among clients present on 
the European Zone.
However, this new stance rather represents the conclusion of the ﬁ rst “round” than the end of the 
“SWIFT case.” Indeed, in 2009 the fragile consensus of 2008 gave way to new disagreements, but this 
" me between European ins" tu" ons as well as between Member States (and even between ministers 
of na" onal governments). It is precisely the modiﬁ ca" on in the SWIFT architecture that triggered these 
new harsh discussions. 
II.3. Towards a European Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
Transatlan" c informal nego" a" ons resumed in 2009 to allow for the US TFTP to con" nue consul" ng 
SWIFT data unrelated to US territory (interview with an adviser of EU permanent representa" on of 
a Member State, May 2009). In July 2009, the European Council mandated the Commission and the 
Swedish presidency of the E.U. to strike a new deal. The E.U.-U.S. nego" a" ons aimed to ensure US 
access to intra-European zone ﬁ nancial data-transfer in spite of their reloca" on to two SWIFT opera" ng 
centers in Europe (in the Netherlands and Switzerland) at the end of 2009. Thus, the purpose of these 
nego" a" ons was to an" cipate the eﬀ ec" ve delocaliza" on of the Belgian business’ opera" onal centers. 
Once again, becoming aware of this project by way of the press, MEPs were quick to complain to the 
Commission. This was reﬂ ected in the adop" on of a new resolu" on meant to reiterate what were 
considered to be the necessary condi" ons for ensuring respect of privacy and the protec" on of data 
(European Parliament 2009a). Reviving fears of the poten" al for economic and industrial espionage, 
the depu" es also solicited a number of minimal guarantees such as a mechanism of reciprocity 
“obliging the competent authori" es of the United States to communicate upon request the relevant 
ﬁ nancial transfer data to the competent authori" es of the Union” (ibid.). Unlike the Parliament, the 
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European Data Protec" on Supervisor was indeed consulted by the Commission in July 2009, giving him 
the opportunity to express doubts concerning the legal basis of the agreement (European Parliament 
2009b). Finally, the Council of the E.U. found it diﬃ  cult reaching a common posi" on, with Austria and 
mainly Germany expressing reserva" ons in regards to the level of data protec" on that had been agreed 
upon (European Voice 2009). A diploma" c cable from the US embassy in Berlin reveals how American 
diplomats “‘were astonished to learn how quickly rumors about alleged US economic espionage’ 
had taken root among German poli" cians who opposed the program” (New York Times 2010.) They 
iden" ﬁ ed Germany as the strongest holdout with regards to the project of agreement.
Such opposi" on in Germany led to US intense lobbying, which showed how the SWIFT case had 
not only raised intra-European tensions but also intra-governmental fric" ons. Indeed, the set of 
transatlan" c nego" a" ons coincided with the re-elec" on of Angela Merkel in September 2009 and the 
end of the “grand coali" on” with the SPD (Social Democra" c Party). Merkel was able to form a new 
governing coali" on between CDU/CSU (Chris" an Democra" c Union/Chris" an Social Union) and FDP 
(Free Democra" c Party) that had become the junior coali" on partner. These new partners did not 
share the same views on the TFTP to the extent that several FDP leaders expressed concerns from 
the beginning of the Swedish nego" ated mandate. Moreover, Jus" ce Minister Sabine Leutheusser-
Schnarrenberger (FDP) “had inserted language into the CDU/CSU-FDP coali" on agreement speciﬁ cally 
addressing the TFTP nego" a" ons and direc" ng Germany to call upon the E.U. to work towards a high 
level of data-protec" on.”25
With regards to the reluctance from one part of this government, US authori" es intensiﬁ ed their 
pressure with the direct involvement of Timothy Geithner (Treasury secretary), Hillary Clinton (Secretary 
of State), James L. Jones (Na" onal Security Advisor) and Eric Holder (A  orney General).26 Furthermore, 
Philip Murphy (US ambassador in Berlin) extensively wrote to German ministers of Interior, of Jus" ce, 
of Finance, of Foreign Aﬀ airs and of Special Aﬀ airs (i.e. chancellery) to convince German government 
not to block EU/US deal. Ul" mately, “Ambassador Murphy met with Interior Minister de Maiziere 
(CDU) on November 27 and urged him to support EU-US nego" a" ons on an interim TFTP agreement, to 
which de Maiziere indicated that he would abstain from vo" ng on the agenda item at the November 30 
COREPER27 mee" ng”28 in Brussels. On the one hand, US authori" es welcomed this absten" on because 
it allowed the transatlan" c deal to pass at the European Council. On the other hand, Interior Minister’s 
decision launched a harsh internal dispute between the new coali" on partners because M. de Maiziere 
overruled his FDP Jus" ce ministry colleague Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger who “complained that her 
views were ignored and that the decision ‘upset millions of ci" zens of Europe’.”29
Even so, European governments (with Austria and Germany abstaining during the Council’s vote) 
ﬁ nally concluded a new agreement with the American authori" es on November 30th, 2009 – that is, just 
one day before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which signiﬁ cantly expanded the preroga" ves 
of the European Parliament concerning this type of interna" onal agreement.30 The agreement, 
however, was strictly provisional, a decision that was oﬃ  cially jus" ﬁ ed as necessary to prevent any 
25. Wikileaks, “Coali" on tested as US-EU TEFTP/SWIFT agreement passes on German absten" on”, Cable 09Berlin1528.
26. Ibid.
27. The COREPER (or Commi  ee of Permanent Representa" ves) is responsible for preparing the works of the EU Council. 
Consis" ng of Member State ambassadors to the E.U., it is presided over by the Member State that holds the presidency of 
the Council.
28. Wikileaks, “Coali" on tested as US-EU TEFTP/SWIFT agreement passes on German absten" on”, Cable 09Berlin1528.
29. In connec" on with this governmental clash, the diploma" c cable adds that minister “de Maiziere told the ambassador that 
he would be expressing some cri" cisms of the agreement publicly in order to reﬂ ect Minister of Interior concerns and to deﬂ ect 
cri" cism. He was subsequently quoted as saying that “a not completely sa" sfactory agreement is be  er that none at all” (ibid.). 
30. Although Spain presidency of the E.U. oﬃ  cially began one month later, another US diploma" c cable stresses that the Spanish 
permanent representa" ve to the E.U. “was very concerned that the interim agreement on TFTP was reached on the last possible 
day before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which mean that Spain needed to be serious about damage control in the wake of 
suspicions that the United States and the EU Council colluded to pre-empt Parliamentary ac" on on the agreement”. Wikileaks, 
“Ambassador Kennard’s mee" ng with Spanish permanent representa" ve to the E.U.”, cable 02Brussels128.
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temporary break in the transfer of data to the United States as it was sent to be stored on the new 
SWIFT server. The Council thus reaﬃ  rmed the legality of this interim agreement and the u" lity of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program for European security, and all this while announcing that a deﬁ ni" ve 
transatlan" c agreement would be nego" ated by late 2010 with the par" cipa" on of the Parliament. 
Not everyone was convinced by this mollifying discourse, however. For instance, the European Data 
Protec" on Supervisor stated that the terms of the agreement remain very privacy intrusive while he 
was not convinced by “this necessity and the real added value with respect to more targeted exis" ng 
instruments” (Hus" nx 2010). Furthermore, the " mely publica" on of the 2nd Bruguière report did not 
win over MEPs while the “eminent European person” insisted on the TFTP as “a highly valuable tool 
used by intelligence and law enforcement agencies to help map out terrorist networks, to complete 
missing links in inves" ga" ons, to conﬁ rm the iden" ty of suspects, to locate the physical whereabouts of 
suspects and to iden" fy new suspects as well as to disrupt a  empted terrorist a  acks.”31 On February 
5th, 2010, the Civil Liber" es Parliamentary Commission (LIBE) adopted a text calling for the terms of 
the transi" onal agreement to be rejected (European Parliament 2010a). A& er being debated in plenary 
session, this posi" on was approved on February 11th by the European Parliament by 378 votes to 196 
and 31 absten" ons. Oﬃ  cially in force 11 days earlier and now invalidated, the agreement thus fell 
vic" m to the ﬁ rst use of the veto that had been a  ributed to the Parliament by the Lisbon Treaty. 
The argument put forward by the Commission and Council warning of a “security gap” in the event of 
rejec" on (for example, see Council of the European Union 2010a) thus did not suﬃ  ce, with Parliament’s 
spokesman reitera" ng concerns about data protec" on and judicial recourse and expressing regret 
that the E.U. “con" nues to externalize its security services to the United States without reciprocity” 
(European Parliament 2010a). The SWIFT aﬀ air thus carried on and was increasingly deﬁ ned around 
a European ins" tu" onal (and intra-na" onal32) confronta" on to which ever more visible American 
pressure is added.33 
Therefore, the so-called “SWIFT aﬀ air” con" nued with European ins" tu" onal confronta" on and US 
pressure during four months un" l the signature of another agreement (Council of the European Union 
2010b, 2010c). Eventually this new version of the text was adopted by the Parliament on July 2010 as 
a result of the nego" a" on of some addi" onal safeguards and commitments (Council of the European 
Union 2010b; European Parliament 2010b). While there is a slight rewri" ng of ar" cles regarding judicial 
redress mechanisms, defense rights and procedural guarantees for European ci" zens and companies, 
the signiﬁ cant changes are not there. Two major last minute compromises emerged. The ﬁ rst one 
entails the appointment of an EU permanent overseer in the U.S. He joins the former team of SWIFT 
inspectors who have to audit and supervise “in real " me and retrospec" vely” the US searches and 
uses of SWIFT messages stored in the Treasury black box. Secondly, Europol becomes the oﬃ  cial body 
to control whether SWIFT data transfer requests from the US Treasury meet the terms of the new 
agreement. Consequently, any transfers of data from European Union to American authori" es require 
Europol staﬀ  authoriza" on. Of course, US requests are s" ll broad in scope, not individualized but now 
oﬃ  cials of the European police oﬃ  ce can block such bulk data provision to the US searchable database 
(black box) if they consider that requests are not suﬃ  ciently jus" ﬁ ed by counter-terrorism needs and/
31. This second report was made available to MEPs on February 1st. The report men" oned that 1550 TFTP-generated reports 
have been sent to Member-States intelligence services since 2001 and the report enumerated several concrete “TFTP value 
examples” (Bruguière 2010). 
32. Another US diploma" c cable released by Wikileaks, dated February 12th, 2010, underlines Chancellor Angela Merkel’s anger 
with regards to the lack of German MEP support for the agreement. New York Times, “Europe Wary of US Bank Monitors”, 
op. cit.; “Wikileaks: Merkel furious at MEPs over SWIFT data sharing deal rejec" on”, available at: h  p://www.ﬁ nextra.com/
news/fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=22073 
33. Some Eurodepu" es judged the pressure from American authori" es on their ins" tu" on to be very unusual, referring in 
par" cular to the telephone call and the le  er from American Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to the President of the European 
Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, prior to the LIBE Commission’s vote. See for example the video, SWIFT Agreement: Issues, Procedure 
and Reac! ons by europarltv. Dated February 5th, 2010, the le  er of Hillary Clinton and Timothy Geithner to Jerzy Buzek is 
available at: h  p://www.europoli" cs.info/pdf/gratuit_en/266006-en.pdf 
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or do not comply with data protec" on standards. Although Europol’s new role is a response to MEPs 
posi" on for the designa" on of an EU authority “with the responsibility to receive requests from the 
United States Treasury Department,” it is simultaneously a concession from MEPs because previous 
Parliament resolu" ons called for a public “judicial” body, not Europol (European Parliament, Commi  ee 
on Civil Liber" es, Jus" ce and Home Aﬀ airs 2010).
Ul" mately, in spite of its importance, this ﬁ ve years agreement has not brought the aﬀ air to an 
end yet. Indeed, the agreement has oﬃ  cially planned the next episode, that is, the examina" on of 
an EU TFTP that was already glimpsed in the previous deal although not so clearly. The idea of an EU 
equivalent system to the US program was formally launched by European Parliament resolu" on of 
September 17th, 2009 (European Parliament 2009a). Such MEPs’ proposal aims at stopping bulk data 
transfer to the extent that the extrac" on and analysis of SWIFT data on EU territory would enable 
to merely deliver data linking to a “speciﬁ c terrorist track” in connec" on with US query (European 
Parliament 2010c). Interes" ngly, the EU counter-terrorism coordinator quickly took up the possibility 
of an EU TFTP in the name of the “development of a more equal partnership with the U.S.” (Council of 
the European Union 2009). Thus, this possibility is part of the E.U.-U.S. deal which makes clear that the 
Commission has to submit a legal and technical proposal one year a& er the 1st August 2010 entry into 
force of the agreement.34 
This key commitment appears highly paradoxical. On the one hand, it is publicly presented as a 
success of the European Parliament regarding privacy issues (European Parliament 2010c). On the 
other hand, this so-called success in the name of privacy makes possible what was unthinkable for 
European security professionals a few years ago, an EU TFTP which would concretely mean Europol’s 
centralized collec" on and analysis of massive ﬂ ows of ﬁ nancial messaging data.35 “I have recently heard 
that SWIFT decided to change its network architecture. SWIFT decided to create a new opera" ng centre 
in Switzerland. Their decision would mean that European data would be only stored in Europe. Frankly, 
that is bad news for European intelligence services because we will never have the poli" cal ability to 
pass a SWIFT mechanism [i.e. TFTP] in Europe” (interview with a European Council Oﬃ  cial, November 
2007). While the EU TFTP is just a paper project for the moment, the state of play has changed since 
this interview in 2007 with an unlikely coali" on of poten" ally contradictory interests that tends to 
support the se*  ng up of an EU equivalent system. Thus, “just do it” would be the next mo  o within 
the European Council, the Commission and so the Parliament a& er the previous “laisser-faire” adopted 
by some Member States un" l the media disclosure of the TFTP and the current “faire faire” which 
consists in outsourcing to the U.S. what the EU security ﬁ eld cannot do (yet). 
C&+*$/40&+
Counter-terrorism prac" ces highlighted by the “SWIFT case” are based on techniques of tracing 
ﬂ ows in order to account for mobility (ﬁ nancial, here). The TFTP aims at loca" ng “suspects” and 
visualizing their rela" onships in following money in its context of movement without infringing on 
the principle of free circula" on of capital. Hence, the US TFTP does not corroborate the idea of any 
mobility/security dilemma whatsoever. Mobility precisely tends to be the crucial element through 
which prac" ces of control and surveillance can be widely deployed. As a result, intelligence is enabled 
by technologies extrac" ng informa" on and monitoring “electronic traces” with the stated aim of 
preven" on. The “SWIFT case” shows how intelligence is understood as mass intelligence driven by 
databases and so& ware related to a massive transfer of data between the global messaging company 
and the US Treasury “black box.” The TFTP system has hence allowed for a focused research by US 
34. The EU Commission published a ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial document (i.e. the impact assessment) in November 2010. Available at: 
h  p://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_home_003_terrorist_ﬁ nancing_tracking_en.pdf 
35. This Europol op" on is the current proposi" on of the European Commission (European Commission 2010).
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authori" es, including on personal data that was neither related to American ci" zens nor generated 
on US territory. This case study is illustra" ve of the current trend in the ﬁ eld of security: security 
professionals increasingly try to gain access to commercial databases for intelligence purposes.
While this paper already emphasizes the uncertain" es and mul" ple tensions of the SWIFT case’s 
cons" tu" ve phases, this conclusion does not intend to sum up them, but seeks to open the debate 
on one ques" on. Is the cri" cal surveillance issue of the US TFTP where it is supposed to be? Although 
the privacy issue of secondary use and the related ques" on of power imbalance has already been 
highlighted and needs further research, there is another underrated topic at stake regarding the TFTP 
func" oning. 
Indeed, the main Orwellian fear of European ins" tu" ons and data protec" on authori" es was the 
possibility of US generalized surveillance of all SWIFT data and ﬁ shing expedi" ons in the US Treasury 
Black box. Hence, the ﬁ ve years agreement insisted on the strict limita" on of the US program to counter-
terrorism purposes (no economic espionage for instance) and the prohibi" on of data mining or any 
type of automated proﬁ ling on ﬁ nancial transac" ons records stored in the US searchable database. 
OFAC queries to Europol (for SWIFT data from the European zone) have to be substan" ated and each 
US counter-terrorist analysts’ search in the black box needs to be targeted and jus" ﬁ ed by a pre-exis" ng 
“terrorism nexus.” Thus, US authori" es have accepted to comply with Europol, not to engage in data 
mining prac" ces and not to extract and process all subset of SWIFT messages transferred to their 
searchable database. Was it such a diﬃ  cult decision for them? 
First of all, the compliance func" on of Europol is undeniably the product of last-minute nego" a" ons 
with regards to the US collec" on of data. Europol’s task formally represents a new step of supervision 
with a signiﬁ cant move from a private overseer to a public one in order to verify the necessity, the 
propor" onality and so the admissibility of US requests. Indeed, although SWIFT representa" ves stated 
that their company already “narrowed the scope of the subpoena to a limited set of data” (European 
Parliament Hearing 2006), Europol’s empowerment has been presented as a stronger guaranty 
to ensure that US queries are “tailored as narrowly as possible in order to minimize the amount of 
data requested (Council of the European Union 2010b).” However, the ﬁ rst months of the E.U.-U.S. 
agreement did not tend to show such a stronger guaranty in prac" ce. In March 2011, Europol Joint 
Supervisory Body (JSB)36 published the conclusions of the ﬁ rst review of Europol’s implementa" on of 
the TFTP agreement. JSB president underlines that “the most ﬁ nding of the inspec" on was that the 
wri  en requests Europol received were not speciﬁ c enough to allow it to decide whether to approve 
or deny them. It was found that the US requests were too general and too abstract to allow proper 
evalua" on of the necessity of the requested data transfers. Despite this, Europol approved each 
request it received” (Joint Supervisory Body 2011a, b). Whereas Europol representa" ves specify that 
certain oﬃ  cials have also received extra informa" on from the US Treasury department via oral brieﬁ ngs 
that inﬂ uence Europol’s posi" ve decisions, informa" on provided orally cannot be checked by the JSB. 
Hence, the rela" onships between the security gap and the supervisory gap remain a controversial issue 
between the various actors engaging in the TFTP agreement.37
Secondly, the terms of the E.U.-U.S. accord do not seem to challenge US previous prac" ces at all 
with reference to informa" on processing. Indeed, there has presumably been no data mining since 
the crea" on of the TFTP and no comprehensive extrac" on as well as no evidence of any use of SWIFT-
36. The main task of this independent body is to ensure that Europol complies with data protec" on principles. See: h  p://
europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/about.aspx 
37. Civil Liberty Commi  ee MEPs strongly cri" cized Europol a& er the release of JSB’s report, saying for instance that “entrus" ng 
this (compliance) task to Europol is like pu*  ng the fox in charge of the chicken coop.” Although the Commission released a 
report which is much more posi" ve regarding the ﬁ rst six months implementa" on of the TFTP agreement, the Commission 
review team also supported the JSB’s concern. Furthermore, a note from the German delega" on (European Council) already 
expressed concerns on the lack of informa" on from the Commission and Europol regarding the implementa" on of the TFTP 
agreement. Finally, Europol published an informa" on note to the European Parliament one month a& er the JSB’s report 
(European Parliament Press 2011; German delega" on 2011; European Commission 2011; Europol 2011).
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derived data for other purposes than counter-terrorism. US authori" es have always rejected allega" ons 
of data mining regarding TFTP as such since the media disclosure. US intense lobbying on a myriad of 
EU actors did not pressure to include such prac" ces. Moreover, absence of proﬁ ling and existence of 
targeted use of data were even one of the main lines of the US argument to jus" fy that the program 
respects “individual privacy.”38 According to current public record on the SWIFT aﬀ air, one can argue that 
US oﬃ  cials readily accepted to oﬃ  cially forbid any type of proﬁ ling to the extent that this acceptance 
changed nothing to the core of the TFTP but added a transatlan" c legal framework and some legi" macy 
to this program. Although misunderstandings about TFTP func" oning have longly focused harsh cri" cs 
in terms of Orwellian and/or algorithmic surveillance, the program does not monitor all data and is not 
a search engine to iden" fy suspicious transac" ons with the help of proﬁ ling so& ware. As promoted 
by US oﬃ  cials and Jean-Louis Bruguiere’s reports, TFTP consists in a device for “mapping out terrorist 
networks” which is based on pre-exis" ng informa" on (i.e. “terrorism nexus”) on one suspect at least in 
order to visualize his ﬁ nancial connec" ons.39
As a result, the surveillance of everyone’s transac" ons is not and has never been on the TFTP 
agenda. The surveillance of people who already fall into the so-called “terrorism nexus” has. Seen in 
this light, the cri" cal issue of the TFTP is not about data mining prac" ces and monitoring of all data. The 
relevant interroga" on becomes: “Who falls into the terrorism nexus deﬁ ned by US agencies?”40 The 
issue at stake slightly shi& s from algorithmic global surveillance and proﬁ ling as pa  ern recogni" on to 
“terrorist lists” and nomina" on procedures. 
Indeed, TFTP analysts search SWIFT messages which include persons or en" " es that have a “pre-
exis" ng nexus to terrorism.” Consequently, their targeted search are mainly name based and they can 
use na" onal and United Na" ons’ oﬃ  cial blacklists of suspected terrorists and see if any extrac" ng 
transac" ons match with those publicly listed names. Nevertheless, one can assume that this kind of 
a  empts is normally doomed to failure because such blacklisted individuals are deemed to have their 
bank account frozen and they a priori cannot do or receive any ﬁ nancial transfers. Therefore, TFTP 
analysts can use watch lists maintained by the federal government but which content is kept secret, 
contrary to the public blacklists. The analysts can resort to the TIDE (Terrorist Iden" " es Datamart 
Environment) database available to US intelligence community and that supports the federal watch 
lis" ng system.41 This so-called “mother of all databases”42 includes all US informa" on about known or 
suspected “interna" onal terrorists.” The TIDE database supplies the US consolidated watch list (i.e. 
the terrorist screening database), which has aggregated former dis" nct watch lists since 2004. The 
FBI manages this consolidated list that daily imports TIDE informa" on. While the terrorist screening 
database also contains data on known or suspected “purely” domes" c “terrorists,” the subset of TIDE 
records represents by far the most part of the consolidated watch list. Various subsets of this list are 
used by government screeners from airport “no ﬂ y list” processes and visa procedures to local law 
enforcement checks. 
As of May 2009, a report from the American Jus" ce Department underlined that the consolidated 
list reached a total of 400,000 individuals corresponding to more than one million names and aliases in 
2008.43 In other words, the US consolidated watch list almost contained 50 " mes the number on the 2008 
38. The argument is s" ll present (see US Department of Treasury 2010).
39. While we have to be careful in order to dis" nguish between systems of jus" ﬁ ca" on of a classiﬁ ed program and “real” 
prac" ces regarding such program, various sources (document and interviews) conﬁ rm at least this func" oning of the TFTP. 
40. As already glimpsed by Ben Hayes, see: h  p://database.statewatch.org/ar" cle.asp?aid=29980
41. See for instance: Na" onal Counterterrorism Center (2011). Terrorist Iden" " es Datamart Environment – Factsheet. Available 
at: h  p://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf; See also the website of the US Na" onal Counterterrorism Center which 
manages the TIDE database: h  p://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html 
42. As stated by John Sco   Redd, the former director of the Na" onal Counterterrorism Center managing the TIDE database 
(in Kessler, Ronald. “NCTC: Up to 70 Terrorist Plots Each Day”, August 15th, 2006. Available at: h  p://archive.newsmax.com/
archives/ar" cles/2006/8/15/92436.shtml). 
43. “FBI policy requires that all subjects of interna" onal terrorism inves" ga" ons be nominated to the consolidated terrorist 
watchlist. It also requires that any known or suspected domes" c terrorist who is the subject of a full inves" ga" on be nominated 
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Interpol’s list of terrorism suspects which almost contained 20 " mes the number of oﬃ  cial blacklists 
maintained by the United Na" ons and the European Union.44 While there are some diﬀ erences other 
than the size of the lists, oﬃ  cial blacklists and the US consolidated watch list and so the TIDE database 
share the same administra" ve and preven" ve character which place their designa" on process beyond 
judicial review. Hence, the aim is not to list individuals who have been convicted of a crime but the ones 
who are under suspicion in the name of preven" on against harmful acts. Such as the lis" ng/delis" ng 
procedures of oﬃ  cial blacklists, the US watch list has been seriously cri" cized in connec" on with 
various ﬂ aws. Thus, the 2009 Jus" ce Department report highlighted problems, mistakes and notably 
revealed that 24,000 persons wrongly ﬁ gured on the FBI terrorist watch list (US Department of Jus" ce 
2009). As of March 2011, the TIDE database included 500,000 individuals.
Accordingly, the TFTP promoters refer to what they call targeted search – in other words targeted 
surveillance. This targeted dimension needs to be put into perspec" ve. Even if TFTP analysts would 
work from a limited subset of TIDE informa" on and the US consolidated watch list, they would work on 
thousands and thousands of individuals. Furthermore, the TFTP inevitably broadens suspicion because 
the purpose of the program is to trace money ﬂ ows related to suspects in order to map out their 
rela" onships, that is, to connect the dots. Such social network analysis de facto entails a mul" plier 
eﬀ ect regarding the number of individuals who can be under suspicion by associa" on. To some extent, 
the TFTP completes full circle. The program is based on pre-exis" ng watch lists which can be then partly 
supplied by the program itself. Consequently, the cri" cal analysis of the ongoing TFTP development 
cannot be limited to specula" ons on data mining prac" ces and general surveillance in order to 
properly illustrate the issue at stake.45 This program of transna" onal communica" on of personal data 
for intelligence purposes also needs to be ques" oned from the lis" ng prac" ces that determine the 
so-called TFTP targeted search. The forma" on of bloated lists of poten" al suspects represents another 
major counter-terrorism trend closely related to cross-cu*  ng mechanisms for (ﬁ nancial) surveillance 
at a distance and mobility controls, in the name of preven" on.
to the watchlist. Under certain circumstances, FBI policy also allows for the nomina" on of known or suspected terrorists for 
whom the FBI does not have an open terrorism inves" ga" on” (US Department of Jus" ce 2009).
44. See: h  p://www.interpol.int/public/FusionTaskForce/default.asp ; Hayes and Sullivan (2011).
45. To be clear, the very func" oning of the TFTP does not presumably refer to data mining process but the cons" tu" on of a 
watch list itself may be linked to such process.
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